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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the District Court's denial of a 
petition for post conviction relief. The Utah Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (Supp. 
1993). Jurisdiction was transferred to this Court under Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court commit error by holding that the 
Petitioners failed to prove they would have insisted upon going to 
trial but for their counsels' errors? 
' Did the trial court commit error by holding that the 
Petitioners failed to meet the prejudice prong necessary to 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, as stated in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984) and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 
L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In deciding the issues presented on appeal, this Court owes no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. The trial 
court's factual findings shall not be set aside on appeal unless 
clearly erroneous. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
present mixed questions of law and fact. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 
P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994). 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution; 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; 
Article I, Sections Seven and Twelve of the Utah Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-3 (1953, as amended); 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Petitioners, Dean K. Hickman and Rick K. Hickman, brought 
this case by filing a Petition for Post Conviction Relief on April 
10, 1992. The Petitioners seek to have their guilty pleas to 
aggravated robbery withdrawn and convictions set aside. (R. at 007) 
The Petitioners assert they were denied the effective assistance of 
counsel when they entered their pleas and their pleas were not 
voluntary, but were coerced in violation of the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Sections Seven and Twelve 
of the Utah Constitution. (R. at 004-007). 
To support their claims, the Petitioners alleged their 
attorneys were constitutionally ineffective because they did not 
engage in discovery and participated in an impromptu meeting with 
a detective for the Salt Lake City Police Department in which plea 
negotiations occurred and threats were made. The Petitioners claim 
that counsels' conduct caused them to plead guilty and that absent 
counsels' conduct, they would not have entered their pleas. (R. at 
004-007) . Finally, the Petitioners claim counsel improperly failed 
to assist in motions to withdraw their pleas and in an appeal. 
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An evidentiary hearing for the Petition came before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on July 27 and 28, 1993. (R. at 175-
283). The Petitioners presented expert testimony to establish the 
standard for reasonableness of representation for counsel, called 
Boyd Hickman, their brother, and testified themselves. (R. at 180-
187, 187-194, 209-258, respectively). The Respondents introduced 
a deposition from Brooke Wells (Defendants' Exhibit 1), the 
attorney appointed to represent Mr. Dean Hickman in the criminal 
case (R. at 195) , and elicited testimony from Manny Garcia, the 
attorney appointed to represent Mr. Rick Hickman in the criminal 
case (R. at 197-205) . The Respondents also elicited testimony from 
two other fact witnesses (R. at 259-268). 
The Petitioners claim that their counsel did not provide 
reasonable representation. The court files in the Petitioners' 
criminal cases showed their counsel did not file a formal discovery 
demand. The Petitioners' attorneys' files showed that "some" 
documents were made available to Mr. Dean Hickman's counsel. The 
documents were never shown to the Petitioners and they were not 
aware of their content. It was not until the discovery in this 
case that the Petitioners learned the two key witnesses for the 
State were allegedly co-conspirators (whose testimony obviously 
lacked credibility). The Petitioners testified that they would 
have gone to trial had they been aware of this discovery. 
The Petitioners also claim their guilty pleas were the product 
of a critical meeting between counsel, their clients and a Salt 
Lake detective. This meeting occurred just before the Petitioners' 
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pleas were entered and should have been confidential. The 
Petitioners allege and testified they were threatened with charged 
and uncharged offenses in the meeting, for which there had been no 
discovery, by the detective and their counsel. Among other things, 
the Petitioners testified they were induced to plead guilty because 
they were told that they must plead to one first degree felony or 
face life in prison because of these alleged offenses. 
The Petitioners also claim that false promises were made in 
this meeting that induced them to plead guilty. Mr. Dean Hickman 
claims and testified his attorney advised him to accept the plea 
because of an agreement to not include a firearms enhancement as 
part of his sentence. (Exhibit 1, p. 5). The evidence in this 
proceeding indicates that Mr. Hickman received a firearm 
enhancement. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3). The Petitioners also claim 
they were falsely promised by their attorneys that the attorneys 
would assist in parole hearings and the Petitioners would serve no 
more than five years if only the Petitioners would plead guilty. 
Further, the Petitioners claim and testified their pleas in 
the District Court were not voluntary and of their own volition. 
Both the Petitioners testified they were "coached" by their counsel 
what to say at the taking of their pleas. In some instances, what 
they were told to say was wrong. 
Both of the Petitioners testified that these errors resulted 
in their pleas. Both testified that but for these errors, they 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial. Both testified they sought the assistance of counsel to 
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file motions to withdraw and to appeal. When their counsel 
refused, the Petitioners proceeded "pro se." 
Judge Rigtrup orally ruled from the bench at the conclusion of 
the hearing, a copy of which is attached in Addendum "A." In his 
oral ruling Judge Rigtrup held that assuming the truth of all of 
the allegations of the deficiencies of counsel, there had not been 
a showing that the Petitioners would have insisted on going to 
trial. (Addendum "A," p.4). 
Judge Rigtrup also orally stated that the claims regarding the 
voluntariness of the Petitioners' pleas should have been brought 
before the trial court when the Petitioners sought to withdraw 
their pleas. Judge Rigtrup stated the Petitioners failed to timely 
raise this issue. (Addendum "A," p.3). 
Judge Rigtrup finally found that the Petitioners did not meet 
the second prong of the standard applied to determine if there is 
constitutionally ineffective counsel when there is a plea of 
guilty. The standard, formulated from Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), 
requires a defendant to show there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsels' errors, he or she would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 
Utah Courts follow a very similar standard. The Utah Supreme 
Court, in Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994), 
recently held that Strickland requires a defendant first show 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
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manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant. Parsons v. Barnes, supra, at 
521. 
Judge Rigtrup formally entered very sparse Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and an Order on September 13, 1993. A copy is 
attached in Addendum "B." In his Findings of Fact, Judge Rigtrup 
found, inter alia, that no discovery had been shared with the 
Petitioners even though "some" discovery was in counsels' 
possession and that a police detective was present during the 
critical meeting between the Petitioners and their counsel. Judge 
Rigtrup found the Petitioners had moved to withdraw their pleas and 
had appealed. Judge Rigtrup then concluded, as a matter of law, 
that the Petitioners failed to prove that absent counsels' errors, 
they would have insisted upon going to trial. Judge Rigtrup, 
therefore, formally held that the Petitioners failed to meet the 
prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, supra, and Hill v. 
Lockhart, supra. 
Judge Rigtrup's legal conclusions were not supported in the 
record or by his sparse Findings of Fact. The Petitioners both 
testified and/or alleged they would not have entered guilty pleas 
if their counsel had met appropriate standards of reasonable 
representation and they would have insisted on a trial. More 
particularly, both testified and/or alleged they would not have 
pleaded guilty if their attorneys would have engaged in discovery 
and consulted with them about the discovery. In addition, both 
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testified and/or alleged they would not have pleaded guilty had 
their attorneys not engaged in the coercive conduct at the critical 
meeting or coached them at the time of their pleas. (R. at 231; R. 
at 255) . Finally, the Petitioners testified and/or alleged that 
they sought the assistance of counsel in proceeding with motions to 
withdraw and with their appeal, but the requests were denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 18, 1985, the Petitioners pleaded guilty to 
aggravated robbery. (Defendants' Exhibits 6 and 7). At the time 
of the pleas, Petitioner Dean Hickman was 20 years old and was a 
tenth grade drop-out. (R. at 221) . Petitioner Rick Hickman was 21 
years old and had not completed the seventh grade. (R. at 246). 
2. The pleas were originally taken in the Circuit Court at 
a time scheduled for a preliminary hearing on a separate and 
unrelated charge. (R. at 193/ R. at 214/ R. at 222). During this 
preliminary hearing, the Petitioners were taken into an adjoining 
room for a meeting with counsel. Their brother, who also was 
arrested and pleaded guilty, was also taken into the room.1 (R. 
at 190/ R. at 215/ R. at 240). 
3. A detective from the Salt Lake City Police Department 
came into the room during the meeting. (Id.) None of the brothers 
understood who the detective was and they talked freely with their 
1
 The third brother, Boyd, had his guilty plea set aside in 
1988. (R. at 188). The State attempted to retry him on the 
Information to which he pleaded guilty and failed. He was released 
from custody in 1989 and has been a productive citizen since that 
time. 
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lawyers in front of him. The detective was permitted to 
participate in confidential communications. (R. at 215-219). 
4. The Petitioners were threatened in this meeting by the 
detective and by counsel that if they did not immediately plead 
guilty to a first degree felony having a penalty of five years to 
life, they would be required to go to trial on several other 
charges and uncharged offenses. They were threatened that they 
would spend the rest of their lives in prison. (R. at 241-251). 
In return for their pleas, the Petitioners were promised by their 
counsel that the other charges would be dismissed, or not filed, 
that counsel would appear at a parole hearing with them and that 
they would spend just five years in prison. (Id.) 
5. The Petitioners specifically requested counsel engage in 
discovery in this meeting, including discovery on the charges that 
were threatened if the Petitioners did not plead guilty. The 
Petitioners were told that, "It was not necessary." (R. at 191; R. 
at 219) . 
6. Consequently, the Petitioners were never apprised of the 
evidence against them. (R. at 220) . The Petitioners did not 
review any discovery with their attorneys. The Petitioners did not 
discuss the evidence for the alleged crime to which they had 
pleaded guilty with their attorneys. (R. at 220; R. at 245). 
7. The Court file in the criminal proceedings contained no 
evidence of a discovery demand being made by either of the 
Petitioners' attorneys. Mr. Rick Hickman's attorney had no 
discoverable information in his file. (R. at 202) . Mr. Dean 
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Hickman's attorney, who had informally been provided with "some" 
discovery materials, did not show it to either Petitioner. (R. at 
220) . 
8. An expert witness, called on the Petitioners' behalf, 
testified that a failure to file a discovery demand, to provide 
discovery to a client and to discuss it with the client prior to a 
plea would not be reasonable representation. (R. at 180-185).2 
9. At the time of the pleas, neither Petitioner knew what 
the evidence was for the crimes for which they were charged nor the 
crimes with which they were threatened. (R. at 224, 252). The 
first and only time the Petitioners were advised of the evidence 
against them was during the course of discovery in this case by the 
attorney appointed to represent them. (R. at 221). 
10. When the Petitioners viewed the discovery, they learned 
for the first time that the key witnesses the State intended to 
call were alleged co-conspirators. (Id.) One had been provided 
with full immunity to avoid prosecution. Both the Petitioners 
testified that if they had seen the discovery, they would not have 
entered a plea of guilty. (R. at 231; R. at 255). 
11. After the meeting with counsel and the detective, the 
Petitioners pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court. Petitioner Dean 
Hickman did not hear from or see his counsel between the Circuit 
2
 Expert testimony elicited on the Petitioner's behalf was 
from Larry Keller, Esq. Mr. Keller has practiced law for more than 
twenty years and emphasizes criminal law in his practice. He is a 
former Judge, having been appointed by the Honorable Scott 
Matheson, is a former prosecutor and legal defender, and is a 
former special prosecutor appointed by the Judges of the Third 
District Court. (R. at 180-182). 
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Court appearance and the time of the taking of his plea in District 
Court. In the District Court, Mr. Dean Hickman was handed a plea 
"affidavit" by his counsel which he had not seen and did not have 
time to read. (R. at 224) . When the Court asked him the questions 
that accompany the taking of a plea, his attorney told him what to 
say. In Dean Hickman's case, the transcript from the plea 
indicates there would not be a firearms enhancement. (R. at 226) . 
The record shows that years after the plea and sentencing, 
Petitioner Dean Hickman received a one line letter from his counsel 
telling him there had been such an enhancement. (R. at 225-227; 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3). 
12. Petitioner Rick Hickman also did not hear from or see his 
counsel between the time of the Circuit Court plea and his 
appearance in the District Court for arraignment, plea and 
sentencing. At that time, counsel came into the courtroom late and 
handed the plea affidavit to Petitioner Rick Hickman. Mr. Rick 
Hickman was not given the opportunity to read the affidavit and was 
told by his counsel "to go with it." The plea affidavit on its 
face contained inaccurate information. (R. at 249). 
13. The Petitioners sought the assistance of counsel for 
motions to withdraw their pleas, for their parole hearings and for 
an appeal that was subsequently filed. Despite the promises of 
assistance, their counsel would not assist them. Both were forced 
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to proceed "pro se."3 (R. at 227; R at 288; R at 250, R at 
251) 
14 The trial court denied the motions to withdraw and the 
Supreme Court rejected the appeal State v Hickman, 779 P 2d 670 
(Utah 1989) The focus of the motions and the appeal were the 
elements of the crime charged. (Id. at 671-672) The Supreme 
Court also examined whether the trial court's failure to ask if 
Dean Hickman's plea was entered free from threats, promises or 
inducements violated Rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
The Court indicated that the record showed Dean Hickman signed a 
plea affidavit, which stated the plea was voluntary. Importantly, 
there is no discussion in the opinion on the statements or conduct 
of counsel at the plea. Thus, there has not been a judicial review 
of the question of whether the Petitioners received effective 
assistance of counsel at the pleas.4 
3
 Dean Hickman's attorney testified she was certain she told 
him that she would appear at the Board of Pardons. At her 
deposition, she looked through her files and messages, had no 
recollection "of being contacted," "and therefore did not appear." 
(Exhibit 1, page 9). Mr. Hickman testified he spoke with his 
attorney and told her about the hearing but she refused to go. (R. 
at 227) . 
4
 As noted, it seems that Judge Rigtrup refused to consider 
the Petitioners' claims in this proceeding regarding the 
voluntariness of the pleas. The formal Findings, however, are so 
sparse that it is no clear. Judge Rigtrup orally commented that 
the Petitioners should have raised their ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim as it relates to voluntariness on their direct appeal 
or their motion to withdraw their plea. As set forth below, there 
is direct authority that would allow Judge Rigtrup or this Court to 
hear these claims. See Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 
1989) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Petitioners met the standards set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed. 203. Both 
testified that they would have insisted upon going to trial but for 
counsels' errors with respect to discovery, the meeting and the 
plea. The testimony is not sufficiently contradicted in the record 
to support Judge Rigtrup's legal conclusion. Moreover, the failure 
of counsel to assist them in withdrawing their pleas and in the 
appeal was prejudicial. This is particularly so because the 
Petitioners, lacking any legal training, did not raise the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, and the 
trial court suggested, but did not formally conclude, that the 
failure barred a review of the claims in this proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Petitioners Did Not Receive Effective 
Assistance of Counsel. 
The Petitioners in this case seek, by post conviction relief, 
to have their guilty pleas to aggravated robbery withdrawn and 
their convictions vacated. The basis for the Petitioners' claims 
is they were denied the effective assistance of counsel and would 
have insisted on a trial absent counsels' errors. 
The law is clear that a criminal defendant pleading guilty to 
a felony charge has a constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 
S.Ct. 7052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) sets forth the two prong standard 
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which must be applied. The right, guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, is a fundamental 
right. Id. It is guaranteed to a State defendant through the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See 
Parsons v. Barnes, supra, at 522; Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 
(Utah 1989); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993) . 
To prevail on their claims, the Petitioners must show 
counsels' performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and must establish, but for counsels' unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984) . 
In appeals this Court should defer to the trial court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous; however, both 
the performance and prejudice standards are mixed questions of law 
and subject to de novo review. Id. at 698, 104 S.Ct. 2070. 
Although Strickland is often cited, it offers very important 
advice that bears repeating. In Strickland, the Court reviewed the 
development of the law regarding effective assistance of counsel. 
466 U.S. at 684. The Court, recognizing the constitutional 
importance of effective counsel in every case, emphasized that 
counsel's function is to assist the defendant and to advocate the 
client's cause. Id. at 688. The Court stressed the "particular" 
duties of "consult[ing] with the defendant on important decisions," 
"keep[ing] the defendant informed of important developments" and 
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bringing to bear such "skill and knowledge as will render the trial 
a reliable adversarial testing process." id. 
Under Strickland a reviewing court defers to counsel's 
performance, particularly on decisions of trial strategy. But 
"counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary." 466 U.S. at 691. If counsel fails to fulfill these 
duties and it is prejudicial to the defense, it will constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims apply directly to 
pretrial procedures, including advice regarding guilty pleas. The 
United States Supreme Court addressed effective assistance of 
counsel in the setting of a guilty plea in Hill v. Lockart, 474 
U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d. 203 (1985). In Hill, the Court 
employed the two prong Strickland test. The performance prong of 
the Strickland test remains the same. In Hill, the Court stated, 
"where...a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea 
process, and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the 
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was 
within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 
cases." id. at 56 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
(1970)) . 
The prejudice prong for a guilty plea focuses on: 
Whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective 
performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In 
other words, in order to satisfy the "prejudice" 
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he 
14 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial. 
Id at 59. 
In this case, the Petitioners have met the second prong of the 
Strickland and Hill tests. The Petitioners explicitly alleged 
and/or testified they would have withdrawn their pleas had their 
counsel engaged in discovery and disclosed the nature of the 
discovery against them, had their counsel refrained from threats 
and provided accurate and not erroneous advice on the sentencing 
and parole process, and had their counsel not permitted a detective 
to participate in plea discussions where confidential 
communications occurred. Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 
S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).5 
B. The Petitioners Demonstrated They Would Not Have 
Pleaded Guilty Had Counsel Engaged in and Shared Discovery. 
Both the Petitioners unequivocally testified they would not 
have gone to trial had they been aware of the evidence obtainable 
in discovery (particularly being made aware that the State's prime 
witness was a co-conspirator who had been provided with immunity) 
and had they not been told that they would be assisted at parole 
hearings and would spend no more than five years in prison. The 
Petitioners' testimony as to their willingness to go to trial is 
not contradicted by evidence in the record. There was no clear 
factual basis for the trial court's conclusion that the Petitioners 
5
 Judge Rigtrup even recognized that this was an unusual case 
because no discovery motion had been filed, that "some" discovery 
had been made available but not shared, and that there was a 
substantial basis for attacking the credibility of the State's 
witnesses. (Addendum A.) 
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failed to prove that absent counsels' errors they "would have 
insisted upon going to trial."6 
Errors like the ones committed by counsel have caused other 
courts to find ineffective assistance. For example, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that counsel's failure to file discovery 
motions can amount to deficient performance. In Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, 474 U.S. 365, 88 L.Ed. 2d. 203, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985), the 
Court addressed a defendant's claim that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance when he failed to file a discovery request 
that would have revealed a basis to challenge incriminating 
evidence. The Court noted that counsel's failure was not based on 
"strategy," but on the mistaken belief that the State was obliged 
to turn over inculpatory evidence. The Court remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing to determine prejudice. To show prejudice, the 
Court indicated that defendant would have to show the outcome of 
his trial would be different. Id. at 391. 
In this case the failure to conduct discovery and to share it 
with the Petitioners was critical. This was not "strategy." It 
was deficient performance under the circumstances. As noted, the 
Petitioners produced expert testimony in this case that a 
reasonable attorney would conduct formal discovery and share the 
6
 Judge Rigtrup's comments from the bench indicate he was not 
persuaded that the Petitioners would have gone to trial because of 
the existence of other threatened charges and a probation violation 
hearing at the time of the pleas. (Addendum "A," at 3). Judge 
Rigtrup, in effect, assumes the Petitioners would not have gone to 
trial. The record does not indicate the Petitioners would not have 
gone to trial for these reasons and their testimony is just 
opposite. 
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discovery with the client. Had discovery been done and shared, the 
Petitioners would have known the State's key witnesses were 
purported Mco-conspirators" that had been provided with immunity. 
Their testimony and credibility should have been subjected to the 
"reliable adversarial testimony process" that Strickland recognized 
was so important for effective counsel to employ. Both the 
Petitioners testified that had they been aware the State's key 
witnesses were purported co-conspirators, they would have gone to 
trial, and it was prejudicial for this to not occur.7 
C. The Petitioners Would Not Have Pleaded Guilty Had 
Counsel Not Made Threats and Allowed a Detective to 
Participate in Key Plea Negotiations. 
Similarly, counsel were constitutionally ineffective when they 
permitted the detective on the case to be present and participate 
in the coercive meeting that lead to the pleas. Joint discussions 
involving criminal defendants and their counsel where strategy, 
facts and defenses are discussed are tenuous. There are obvious 
problems of confidentiality. There are problems protecting against 
incriminating statements. When the State is present, as it was in 
this case, these problems become insurmountable. At a minimum, the 
State learns the strengths and weaknesses of the defense. The 
effectiveness of counsel in a trial or in negotiating a plea 
7
 Judge Rigtrup's finding that the Petitioners' counsel had 
"some" discovery illustrates the importance of a discovery motion 
and the sharing of materials with a criminal defendant. Without a 
demand, the prosecution need not provide all discoverable 
materials. This is not a case where there was an open file policy 
and the court ruled the Petitioners received all the materials to 
which they were entitled. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 
(Utah 1994) (failure to file discovery not prejudicial when there 
was an "open file policy" and no prejudice shown). 
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bargain is significantly reduced, if not eliminated.8 After such 
a meeting, there is likely no available alternative except to enter 
a plea. The Petitioners claim they would not have entered a plea 
but for counsel allowing the detective to be present in the 
meeting. 
Similarly, the coercive statements made by the detective and 
by counsel to cause the Petitioners to enter their pleas constitute 
ineffective assistance. Judge Rigtrup found the Petitioners were 
told there was substantial evidence against them. They were not 
told, however, what the key evidence was or that it primarily 
consisted of the testimony of co-conspirators. The Petitioners 
were also told of other uncharged offenses, but were rebuffed when 
they asked for discovery to be accomplished on the other alleged 
cases.9 
Instead of conducting discovery and properly informing the 
Petitioners, counsel erroneously promised the Petitioners would 
only serve five years for a guilty plea. The Petitioners were 
assured of this because their attorneys were going to assist them 
in the parole process. The Petitioners based their decision to 
plead on this advice and assurance. 
8
 Although the evidence showed that the detective was present 
during some of the meeting, and Judge Rigtrup so found, the 
attorney for Mr. Rick Hickman could not recall if the detective was 
present. The attorney agreed, however, that the presence of a 
detective "would be totally improper." (R. at 202). 
9
 The best indicator of the legitimacy of the other cases is 
Boyd Hickman's case. After he withdrew his plea, the State 
attempted to retry Boyd Hickman on the very same Information. Mr. 
Hickman was found "not guilty" and was immediately released by the 
Court. 
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In fact, the record in this case indicates, at least for Dean 
Hickman, that there was a firearms enhancement which would mean 
Dean Hickman was never eligible for a five year sentence. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953, as amended).10 The record also shows 
that despite the promises of counsel, they were not assisted in the 
parole process. Thus, the very keys to the decision to enter a 
plea of guilty, upon which the Petitioners relied in making their 
decision, were not true. 
This case is like Garmon v. Lockhart, 938 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 
1991) . In Garmon, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals found that a 
criminal defendant met both prongs of Strickland where his counsel 
gave him erroneous information on which he based his decision to 
plead guilty. The Court affirmed the district court's holding that 
the defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. The 
Court dismissed, as this Court should, the contention that because 
the defendant risked a longer prison term if he went to trial, the 
defendant would not be prejudiced by the erroneous advice. The 
Court relied on the defendant's testimony that he would have risked 
the longer sentence had he been aware that he would have been 
eligible for parole in fifteen, not five years. See also U.S. v. 
10
 There is a dispute between counsel and the Petitioners on 
whether they were told they would serve only five years or "five 
years to life." There is no dispute, however, that even if it was 
"five years to life," the advice was wrong for Dean Hickman because 
of the enhancement. 
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Loughay, 908 F.2d 1014 (D.C.Cir. 1990) (ineffective assistance 
focused on failure to be aware of the law) .1X 
Moreover, counsels' conduct prior to and at the time the pleas 
were entered in the District Court only served to compound the 
problems. The Petitioners were young and not educated. The 
threats that were made caused them to enter the pleas in Circuit 
Court. Then their counsel did not communicate with them prior to 
the taking of the pleas in District Court. The Petitioners did not 
have the time to read the plea affidavits which they ultimately 
signed (but did not fill out) and, in haste, the Petitioners' 
counsel "coached" them as to what to say. 
Judge Rigtrup further erred to the extent the formal Findings 
do not address the issues regarding counsels' threats and conduct 
at the pleas. Judge Rigtrup only found that the Petitioners filed 
a motion to withdraw which the Supreme Court affirmed. Judge 
Rigtrup made no legal conclusion except that Petitioners failed to 
show prejudice (Addendum "A"). 
If Judge Rigtrup's formal Findings are read to find the 
Petitioners were barred from making these claims, Judge Rigtrup was 
wrong. The Motion to Withdraw and appeal were pursued "pro se." 
The Petitioners, lacking any training in the law, sought the 
assistance of their counsel in the filing of the motions and in the 
11
 Counsel for Dean Hickman admitted she likely told him that 
she would appear at the parole board, but was never advised of the 
time it was scheduled. Mr. Hickman testified he personally told 
her. It would seem obvious that once counsel advised a client that 
they would assist, they would be certain they knew when the parole 
hearing occurred and would fulfill his or her promise. 
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appeals. They were told assistance would not be provided. The 
Petitioners did not raise the "effective" assistance of counsel 
claim because they were uninformed and alone in the process. 
Judge Rigtrup wrongly concluded the Petitioners were barred in 
these circumstances. It is well established that such claims 
regarding ineffective assistance may be considered for the first 
time on a petition for extraordinary relief. Gerrish v. Barnes, 
844 P.2d 315 (Utah 1992); Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 
(Utah 1989); Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989). 
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has frequently resolved issues 
asserted in petitions for post conviction relief even though the 
issues raised were known or should have been known. Hurst v. Cook, 
supra at 1036. 
In the Petition in this case, the Petitioners claimed they 
were denied the effective assistance of counsel at the time of 
their motions to withdraw and appeal. They requested but did not 
receive the assistance of their attorneys even though Utah law, 
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-3 and United States Supreme Court precedent, 
Donald v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L.Ed. 2d. 811, 83 S.Ct. 814 
(1963), allows for counsel on appeal. 
In the case of Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 
1989) , the Court held that an inmate whose allegedly ineffective 
trial counsel also represented him in direct appeal was not barred 
from using claims of habeas corpus to raise the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel when such claim was not raised on 
appeal. The court stated, "the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
21 
assistance of counsel is impelled if an alleged violation of that 
right cannot be raised for the first time in a habeas corpus 
proceeding when the allegedly ineffective trial counsel also 
represented the defendant on appeal and failed to raise the issue 
at that stage." id. at 550. 
In this case, the Petitioners were denied the right to 
effective assistance of counsel to represent them. They sought the 
assistance of their counsel for the Motion to Withdraw and for the 
appeal. This is much like Fernandez. The Petitioners' failure to 
raise the issue should not defeat the claims of ineffective counsel 
when the claim is that counsels' failure to assist in the appeal 
was constitutionally ineffective. The failure to raise ineffective 
counsel by unskilled and unknowing defendants (now the Petitioners) 
who did not want to but proceeded "pro se" should not have 
precluded the trial court and should not preclude this Court from 
examining the merits of the claim. 
22 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioners have shown counsel committed errors, and but 
for those errors they would have insisted on a trial. The 
Petitioners have met the standards of Strickland and Hill. The 
Petitioners respectfully request the Court reverse the trial court, 
permit them to withdraw their guilty pleas and vacate their 
sentences. 
DATED this 2 2 _ _ daY o f December, 1994. 
APPEL & MATTSSON 
'James L. Warlaumont ~^Z> T~i ~Y^7/? ff~- *>-
Attorney for Pet i t ioners /IMdiM^ r'KA^<^<^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on this ijffl^ day of December, 1994, that I 
caused and true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Petitioners/Appellants to be hand- delivered to the following: 
Angela F. Micklos, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
INDEX TO ADDENDA 
A. Judge Rigtrup's Ruling from the Bench at the Conclusion 
of the 1993 Hearing 
B. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order signed by 
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P R O C--E--F D--T M -g.-q 
THE COURT: It's striking to the Court 
that the Petitioners, according to Dean's testimony, 
met for an hour and a half. The positive details the 
Court has before it leave a lot to be desired. 
The Court has no substantial doubt, 
based upon Mr. Garcia's testimony, that Officer Bell 
came in at least in the latter part of the meeting 
that was going on. And the Court recognizes that the 
plea negotiations were taking place very early on. I 
don't think I can remember a file that gets to this 
level of court, where the Legal Defenders' Office is 
involved and files a formal written appearance, that 
the discovery request is not in the file. It is just 
a routine practice of that office. They weren't at 
this level at the time they entertained the plea 
negotiations. 
The Court has no doubt from all of the 
evidence that Ms. Wells did have in her possession 
some discovery materials. There's no doubt to the 
Court that at least she, in a conclusory sort of way, 
advised the Defendants that there was substantial 
evidence against them. It's clear from this evidence 
that one of the witnesses against ihem, or two of the 
potential witnesses against them, were 
2 
1 co-conspirators. And although thatfs a substantial 
2 basis for attacking credibility at trial, the 
3 Defendants had a pending order to show cause 
4 proceeding pending before Judge Banks. For them to be 
5 talking about the potentiality of a habitual criminal 
6 charge against them, they had to have at least a one 
7 - - a second degree felony conviction, with the 
8 potential of being convicted on at least a second 
9 degree felony in the case before the Court; and the 
10 the pending potential of other charges being made 
11 against them. 
12 The case concerning the voluntariness of 
13 the plea agreement was considered before Daniels. It 
14 was appealed. And, certainly, they knew at that point 
15 whether they were intimidated or threatened and 
16 coerced to enter the plea which was considered by 
17 Judge Daniels and was considered by the Utah Supreme 
18 Court on appeal. They had an obligation to timely 
19 raise that, and they failed to do so. 
20 The Court simply is not persuaded from 
21 the record before it, given that context, that the 
22 errors of counsel — and the Court does feel that it's 
23 clear from the record that the physical discovery 
24 materials that Brooke Wells had were not shared. It's 
25 clear to the Court that, other than in a conclusory 
3 
1 way, she didn't discuss those apparently with great 
2 specificity. However, there's been no showing in this 
3 hearing as to -- assuming the truth o<! all of the 
4 allegations of the defectiveness of representation of 
5 counsel or ineffective assistance of counsel, that 
6 they would have insisted on going to trial having once 
7 been bound over to the District Court. 
8 And the Court finds and concludes the 
i second prong of the Hi-li and Strixrk i'an-d cases have not 
10 been met; accordingly, the Petition is denied. 
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236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN K. HICKMAN, 
RICK K. HICKMAN, 
Petitioners, 
TAMARA HOLDEN, 
FRED VAN DER VEUR, 
Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 920902029 HC 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Petitioners' petition for habeas corpus or post-conviction 
relief came before the court for an evidentiary hearing July 27 and 
28, 1993, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding. Petitioners 
were present and were represented by Andrea C. Alcabes. 
Respondents were represented by Angela F. Micklos, Assistant 
Attorney General. After hearing testimony, receiving evidence, and 
hearing arguments of counsel, the Court, being fully advised, now 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On January 18, 1985, Petitioners pled guilty to 
aggravated robbery. 
2. Petitioner Dean Hickman was represented by Brooke Wells. 
Petitioner Rick Hickman was represented by Manny Garcia. 
3. On or about December 15, 1984, petitioners met with their 
attorneys in a room in the circuit court building to discuss the 
charges against them. 
4. Detective Don Bell of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department came in at least during the latter portion of the 
meeting between petitioners and their attorneys. 
5. Brooke Wells had some discovery materials relating to the 
aggravated robbery charges. 
6. Ms. Wells neither shared the physical discovery materials 
with petitioners, nor discussed their content with great 
specificity. However, she did advise petitioners, at least in a 
conclusory manner, that there was substantial evidence against 
them. 
7. Two of the prosecution's potential witnesses were co-
conspirators . 
8. Petitioners had a pending order to show cause proceeding 
pending before Judge Banks. 
9. In 1988, petitioners filed a motion to withdraw their 
pleas", which Judge Daniels denied. 
10. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the denial of 
petitioners1 motion. 
2 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Even if all of petitioners' allegations regarding 
counsels' deficiencies are true, petitioners failed to prove that 
absent counsels' errors, they would have insisted upon going to 
trial. 
2. Petitioners failed to meet the prejudice prong necessary 
to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, as stated in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Hill v. 
Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
ORDER 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED as follows: The petition for habeas corpus or post-
conviction relief is denied. 
DATED this 13 -^day of 
H£)NOR&BLE KENKET; 
Third District Cdfort 
Approved as to form: 
/s/ 
ANDREA C. ALCABES 
Attorney for petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing unsigned FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^ T d a y of August, 1993 to: 
Andrea C. Alcabes, Esq. 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
136 South Main Street, Suite 910 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Lo/g. i-inurvx* 
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